Northern Front

Events accelerate on the Sudanese frontier. After coming under pressure from Gazelle Force and recognising the impossibility of defending the area effectively, Generale Luigi Frusci (Governor of Eritrea) obtains authorization from Amedeo di Savoia-Aosta to begin a progressive withdrawal of his troops from mid-January. The aim is to abandon the various frontier crossing points, notably at Kassala, and fall back on a stronger defensive line in the Eritrean highlands, thereby preventing any enemy advance into the heart of Italian territory. The final phase of the withdrawal takes place during the night of 16/17 January, when the II Brigata Coloniale under Generale Orlando Lorenzini leaves Kassala for the Keru—Biscia—Aicota sector. These movements are detected by aerial reconnaissance and by the decryption of Italian messages. General William Platt then brings forward the start of the British offensive to 19 January 1941.[1]

The various air units are ordered to move to forward airfields no later than the afternoon of 18 January[2]. Accordingly, five Vickers Wellesley of No.47 (RAF) Squadron, led by Flight Lieutenant Stewart, proceed to Blackdown (near Gedaref) at 14:00.[3]

The Regia Aeronautica is not inactive, as a bombing of Summit aerodrome is reported. The attack, said to have been carried out in the morning by an Italian bomber, causes only negligible damage. Further attacks are reported against the stations at Haiya and Gebeit, with, according to British documents, limited success.[4] These events may have occurred between 03:15 and 11:50.[5]

Southern Front

Events in Kenya remain dominated by the attack on the El Yibo sector.

At dawn, Hartbees of No. 40 (SAAF) Squadron attack Italian positions to clear the way for the South African troops. However, as a South African correspondent explains, the engagement quickly descends into chaos:

« It was a battle of almost musical comedy confusion with the green South Africans at first unable to find their objective, then sending panicky signals for air and artillery support to crack the position. (…) With a little enterprise we could easily have surrounded and forced surrender on the first day. »[6]

Brigadier F. A. L. Buchanan divides his force into three elements:

• Force A, composed of the 2nd Abyssinian Irregulars, equipped with several vehicles from the 1st Natal Mounted Rifles and two wireless sets, is to infiltrate behind the Italian positions during the night to prevent any withdrawal once the main attack begins ;
• Force B, consisting of B Company of the 1st Natal Mounted Rifles and five armoured cars of the 2 S.A. Armoured Car Company, is tasked with a frontal attack ;
• Force C, with C Company of the 1st Natal Mounted Rifles and two armoured cars, is to attack the flanks to distract the enemy and support Force B.

Force A manages to reach its position, though only in the early morning and already behind schedule. Force B falls even further behind and does not begin its assault until late morning—and in the wrong place. The Italian troops are thus able to evacuate the threatened area, leaving a screen of Banda behind them to slow the South Africans. The attack verges on the farcical when several armoured cars allow some of the Italian Banda to slip away, mistaking them for the patriots of the 2nd Abyssinian Irregulars owing to a complete loss of communications between the forces. The situation is then highly confused, as Brigadier Buchanan incorrectly reports at about 14:30 that El Yibo has been captured, and orders the attack to continue towards El Sardu.

After a series of movements, the South Africans realise their error of position, but their troops are by then exhausted and short of water. A withdrawal is ordered in the late afternoon, in preparation for a renewed attack the following day. In a message transmitted to the command of the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel McMillan states:

« today’s action realize enemy’s resources have increased and are considerable ».

For his part, Brigadier Buchanan requests :

« additional troops, ammunition, bombs, wire and water be immediately available (…) his opinion that El Yibo lugga presented considerable tactical problems »[7]

According to Douglas Baker, a soldier of the 1st Natal Mounted Rifles :

« The target was unclear and was presumed to have been occupied in the first skirmish, which occurred between 10:00 and 15:00 hours. This alone had tired out our forces throught heat exhaustion. Then it was found that El Yibo hadn’t been attacked at all ! The target lay a few further miles on. By now the regiment was exhausted and had run out of the most precious of all commodities at this stage which was… water.»[8]