He takes off in the only Fairey Battle Mk I available—no. 901—with Air Corporal Brian Ackerman and Air Corporal Erik H. Pettersen. Over the target, the aircraft is hit by anti-aircraft fire from two ships, and Major Robert H. Preller turns back, when he comes upon Afmadow aerodrome (Italian Somaliland). He cannot resist and makes two runs, whereupon his radiator is hit by ground fire. Finally, the pilot is forced to force-land in Italian Somaliland. The three crewmen, only slightly wounded, recover the Lewis gun and set fire to the Fairey Battle. After seven days’ exhausting march, they finally find water.

According to Major Robert H. Preller:

« We had lost all sense of direction. Ackerman and I even went so far as to open the compass and drink the fluid. As the alcohol had dried up, we mixed it with our urine, but it only made matters worse. In the end, given Ackerman’s exhaustion, I decided to leave my crew by a waterhole and go on alone towards the frontier in search of help. Fortunately, I eventually met two Somalis, who led me to the nearest post of the King’s African Rifles.»

On 1 July 1940, Pilot Officer Alexander T. R. Hutchinson of No.237 (Rhodesia) Squadron conducts a patrol in the Garissa (Kenya)—Liboi (Kenya) sector when he sights several camels. Passing overhead, he notices a khaki-clad European signalling to him. A detachment is quickly sent to the spot, where it finds Major Robert H. Preller. He reports having left two crewmen by a waterhole, which he roughly indicates on a map. The two are rescued on 4 July 1940. Major Robert H. Preller is awarded the D.F.C. on 9 October 1940.

Major Robert H. Preller, photographed later with his dog. Collection: Lawrie Shuttleworth, via Tinus le Roux.

Djibouti

Djibouti (French Somaliland) is far from negligible, despite the territory’s small size relative to East Africa as a whole, for two essential reasons that should be set out to understand the air operations that will unfold there in the second half of June 1940.

First, it is worth recalling the Italian claim to Djibouti (French Somaliland). This is notably underlined in a speech by Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, to Parliament:

« The entry into force of the Easter Pact has been an effective and concrete contribution to the consolidation of peace. That consolidation is, and will remain, the supreme objective of our policy; we shall pursue it with tenacity and realism, coupled with the circumspection that is indispensable when one intends to protect, with inflexible firmness, the interests and natural aspirations of the Italian people (at this point, in several parts of the Chamber there are cries of: “Tunis! Djibouti! Corsica!” — the President rings the bell and calls for order, but the demonstration continues). »

In parallel, from 1938 onwards, a genuine press campaign breaks out over the question of Djibouti (French Somaliland) and the requisite colonial ‘compensations’. The territory is described as a:

‘An absurdity and an insult to our imperial dignity … Djibouti [must] become an Italian port on Italian soil … a thorn … a boil.’

An indirect proposal is even put to the French Government to negotiate with the British for the cession of the Cheikh-Saïd peninsula (Yemen) in exchange for Djibouti (French Somaliland).

Practical problems also arise in delimiting the frontiers between Eritrea, Ethiopia (whose claims the Italians adopt), and Djibouti (French Somaliland). From 1936, Italian troops do not hesitate to occupy certain outposts physically, and to run a propaganda campaign among the Afar tribes. Thus, on 15–16 June 1937 an Italian méhariste platoon enters the Hanlé Plain (French Somaliland) to lay out on the ground inscriptions in white-painted stones: ITALIA. A French post is evacuated, whereupon the Italians install themselves. A report of 12 December 1938 records that the Italians occupy an area of 2,700 square kilometres in the Hanlé Plain and 200 square kilometres around Douméra (French Somaliland). Thus, a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent by the Embassy of France in Italy and dated 1 March 1939, states:

« Mussolini is said to have ordered, a month ago, that a border incident be engineered in French Somaliland to trigger negotiations rather than an armed conflict. »

The claim pursues several aims: economic—thanks to its excellent port and the railway linked to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), seen as essential to facilitate Italian settlement and exchanges with the metropole—and political, by eliminating a supposed centre of Ethiopian intrigue and smuggling.

Added to the Italian claim is a strictly military dimension, for Djibouti (French Somaliland) serves as a key hub in the Franco-British scheme against Italian East Africa. The plan is to mount the main effort from Djibouti, which fields the largest ground forces in the region, while the RAF (based at Aden) and the Royal Navy provide support. Allied troops can then concentrate on the Ethiopian towns where Italian troops are stationed.

As evidence of this priority, the plan provides that, in the event of a prior Italian offensive, British troops are to abandon British Somaliland and fall back on Djibouti (French Somaliland), while General Paul Legentilhomme is charged with commanding the French and British forces in the Somalilands. According to a joint report of 11 January 1940:

« despite the Italians’ great numerical superiority, Djibouti (French Somaliland) is now impregnable for them; and from this base, once the reinforcements envisaged in the event of hostilities have arrived, offensive operations can be launched towards the Ethiopian high plateaux. »

However, the French air component in theatre is notably weak. There is only a single escadrille de la Côte française des Somalis, with a skeletal establishment of fourteen obsolete Potez 25s and Potez 29s, and four Potez 631s, under Capitaine Louis Bilbaut. Unfortunately, we have no firm information on Armée de l’Air activity during this period, though Italian documentation suggests a few sorties by French aircraft near the frontiers.

The situation around Djibouti (French Somaliland) remains relatively calm despite Italy’s entry into the war. At 04:00 on 11 June, Italian troops advance into the interior but are quickly halted by fire from French border posts. Skirmishing continues until 15 June, with infiltration attempts and counter-attacks that have no significant human impact. On 16 June, Potez 25s are reported bombing the post at Daouenlé (Ethiopia), according to Italian documentation.

At least two Italian reconnaissance sorties are reported: the first by an IMAM Ro.37bis of 110 Squadriglia over the port of Djibouti (French Somaliland), and the second by a Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 of 15 Squadriglia over the interior.

Events shift abruptly on 17 June, as the French collapse is confirmed by the request for an armistice. By then, the Italians have for several days had a memorandum setting out their claims, notably that Djibouti (French Somaliland) is to be attached immediately to Italian East Africa (AOI). To support this, they consider it essential to launch a rapid land and air offensive to occupy the territory—or, at the very least, to block any move to rally to the United Kingdom.