Introduction
After the fall of British Somaliland, the theater of operations will enter a period of calm until the end of 1940. Indeed, the two main belligerents come out exhausted of the first months of combat, while a situation of shutdown is required in land operations.
Indeed, despite its victories the Regia Aeronautica must recognize losses quite heavy and difficult to compensate because of the lack of connection with the metropolis. Therefore, for the command, only one decision is necessary: to limit the operations as much as possible and to rebuild reserves while waiting for the future events. On the ground, the same imperatives are stated since the prerequisites for the defense strategy have been fulfilled. As an offensive to the south (Kenya) provides no immediate benefit and that to Egypt across Sudan (mentioned by several authors) is more of a fantasy than anything else, the goal now is to wait for the future events.
The RAF is not in a better situation as the air attacks against Eritrea have yielded negligible results for relatively large losses, while the defense of British Somaliland was very expensive. For example, the squadrons on Vickers Wellesley, in Sudan, are now compelled to regroup to hope to line up four or five bombers, and those based at Aden must recover losses. For example, No.11 and No.39 (RAF) Squadron have only five Bristol Blenheim Mk I). Added to this is the gradual withdrawal of units for re-equipment or redeployment to other theaters of operations. The situation is similar to the ground because the British do not yet have sufficient means to consider an operation.
Finally, it is towards the third actor, the SAAF, that the center of gravity moves. Indeed, after a difficult start, the month of August sees a substantial strengthening. Thus, No.11 (SAAF) Squadron returns with a full endowment in Fairey Battle. However, if this aircraft has shown its limits in Europe, it is able to do wonders in East Africa with its bomb capacity and speed compared to potential opponents. In collaboration with Junkers Ju.86, South Africans are then able to launch a The Bomber Offensive towards Somalia and Southern Ethiopia. Added to that the progressive deployment of Fighter Squadrons. After its brief passage in June, the few aircraft had been tasked with protecting Kenya’s ports. But from early August, the first elements are back on the advanced terrain, gradually strengthened, by several Gloster Gladiator recovered in Egypt. This creates a differentiation between the No.1 (SAAF) Squadron in Sudan, and the No.2 (SAAF) Squadron in Kenya. However, the first fights proved to be very difficult because of the lack of modern aircraft and the inexperience of the South African pilots. From these beginnings, the command quickly adopts a doctrine : if the South African fighters is not able to eliminate in the sky, it will have to crush the Regia Aeronautica on ground.
